

**Day 1, Thursday, May 23****8:30 - 9:00 Welcome Coffee and Registration****9:00 - 10:30 Parallel Sessions 1****Room A - Floor -1, Theater Room****Room B - Ground Floor, Auditorium (Előadóterem) E.III.ea****Networks I (Room A)****Nicolás Oviedo-Dávila** Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
*Contracts, Incentives, and Peer Effects in the Workplace***Francis Bloch** Paris School of Economics
*Task Allocation in Networks***Tim Hellmann** University of Southampton
*Stable Signed Networks***Cooperative Game Theory I (Room B)****Labrini Zarpala** Utrecht University
*A Core-selecting Auction for Portfolio's Packages***Martin Černý** Charles University
*On Entrance of a New Agent to a Market***André Casajus** University of Leipzig
*Random Partitions, Potential of the Shapley Value, and Games with Externalities***10:30 - 11:00 Coffee Break (Floor -1, Faculty Club)****11:00 - 12:00 Keynote Lecture (Room B):** Friederike Mengel (University of Essex)
*Influence in Social Networks***12:00 - 13:30 Lunch at Opus Jazz Club (Budapest Music Center), Mátyás u. 8, 1093****13:30 - 15:00 Parallel Sessions 2****Matching I (Room A)****Márton Benedek** Corvinus University
*Partitioned Matching Games for International Kidney Exchange***Alexey Kushnir** Tepper School of Business
*Undergraduate Course Allocation through Competitive Markets***David Pérez-Castrillo** Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
*The Equilibrium-Value Convergence for the Multiple-Partners Game***15:00 - 15:30 Coffee Break (Floor -1, Faculty Club)****15:30 - 17:00 Parallel Sessions 3****Experiments and Networks (Room A)****Agnieszka Rusinowska** Paris School of Economics
*Competing for Influence: An Experiment on Multi-Agent Network Targeting***Fernando Payró Chew** Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
*Bayesian Adaptive Choice Experiments***Marco Pelliccia** Heriot-Watt University
*Incentive Design on Networks***Political Economy (Room B)****Giovanni Valvassori Bolgè** ETH Zurich
*Mechanism Design by a Politician***Maxim Senkov** European Research University
*Should Politicians be Informed? Targeted Benefits and Heterogeneous Voters***Noémie Cabau** Budapest Uni. Of Technology & Economics
*Signaling Effort: Information Structures in a Principal-Agent Model***Coalition Formation I (Room B)****Alexander Shapoval** University of Łódź
*Tiebout-Weibull Equilibrium of City Population: Reconciliation of Gibrat's and Zipf's Laws***Amit Dekel** Paris School of Economics
*Set-Valued Rational Expectations and Farsighted Stability***Péter Bayer** Toulouse School of Economics
*Partition Formation: Inference Models and Microfoundations***17:00 - 17:15 Coffee Break (Floor -1, Faculty Club)****17:15 - 18:15 Keynote Lecture (Room B):** Bettina Klaus (University of Lausanne)
*Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Coalition Formation Problems with Friend-Oriented Preferences***18:30 - 19:30 CTN Board Meeting****20:00 - 23:00 Dinner at Hemingway Étterem (Kosztolányi Dezső tér 2, 1113)**

**Day 2, Friday, May 24****8:30 - 9:00 Welcome Coffee and Registration****9:00 - 10:00 Parallel Sessions 4****Coalition Formation II (Room A)**

Ryo Kawasaki Tokyo Institute of Technology
Farsighted Stability and Top Trading Cycles in Generalized Matching Problems

Sareh Vosooghi KU Leuven
Mindset of Policymakers Matters: Cases of Climate Coalition Formation

10:00 - 10:15 Coffee Break (Floor -1, Faculty Club)**10:15 - 11:15 Parallel Sessions 5****Cooperative Game Theory II (Room A)**

Christopher Stapenhurst Budapest Uni. of Technology & Economics
Efficient, Fair and Stable Agreements for Marine Plastic Pollution

Inés Macho-Stadler Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Sequential Creation of Surplus and the Shapley Value

11:15 - 11:30 Coffee Break (Floor -1, Faculty Club)

11:30 - 12:30 Keynote Lecture (Room B): Szilvia Pápai (Concordia University)
Affirmative Action Policies in School Choice: Immediate versus Deferred Acceptance

12:30 - 14:00 Lunch at Opus Jazz Club (Budapest Music Center), Mátyás u. 8, 1093**14:00 - 15:30 Parallel Sessions 6****Social Choice (Room A)**

Héctor Hermida-Rivera Budapest Uni. of Technology & Economics
Minimal Stable Voting Rules

Anna Bogomolnaia University of Glasgow
Fair Division Under Different Entitlements: A Quest for Round Robin

Matteo Triossi Università Ca' Foscari
Expectations, Cores, and Strategy-Proofness Under Externalities

15:30 - 16:00 Coffee Break (Floor -1, Faculty Club)**16:00 - 17:30 Parallel Sessions 7****Matching II (Room A)**

Anh Triêu Maastricht University
Matching Maximization Mechanism

Flip Klijn Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC)
Characterizing the Typewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets

Rasoul Ramezani University of Lausanne
The Division Problem of Chances

17:30 - Farewell**Industrial Economics (Room B)**

Andrew Mackenzie Maastricht University
Auctions For a Regulated Monopolist

Fynn Louis Närmann Bielefeld University
Sequential Price Discrimination in Selling Information Goods

Networks II (Room B)

Stephen Nei University of Exeter
A Hedonic Model of the Dynamic Formation of Networks and Homophily

Elena Parilina Saint Petersburg State University
Dynamic Network Formation with Farsighted Players and Limited Capacities

Game Theory and Networks I (Room B)

Marieke Pahlke Corvinus University
Knightian Equilibria in Activism Games

Péter Csóka Corvinus University
An Axiomatization of the Pairwise Netting Proportional Rule in Financial Networks

Jérôme Dollinger UC Louvain
On the Existence of Setwise Stable Hypergraphs of Relationships

Game Theory and Networks II (Room B)

Wei Zhao Renmin University of China
Robust Centrality

Yevgeny Tsodikovich Bar-Ilan University
Centrality Measure for Opinion Dynamics

Yannick Jansen University of Antwerp
Social Learning and Stubbornness